INTERNATIONAL TAXATION The Chartered Accountant • February 2023 • Vol. 71 • No. 08 • pp. 50–55 (Journal pp. 878–883)

BEPS 2.0 – Two Pillar Inclusive Framework

VR
CA. Vivek Raju P
Author is member of the Institute • Contact: vivekrajup@yahoo.co.in / eboard@icai.in
“The advent of internet and globalisation enabled large Multi-National Companies (MNCs) to devise innovative structures for minimising tax liabilities. Currently all the functions from starting a business to selling products/services and remittances, are digitally managed without any need for physical presence. Thus, it is imperative that the current international tax laws be reformed to address how the digital economy is taxed.”

Nations across the globe worked on the inclusive framework. On 12 October 2020, OECD issued a blueprint on the two-pillar approach to address the current gaps. In July 2021 approximately 130 nations signified their consent to the approach. Though a lot of work is still pending on how these pillars can be made operational, this article explains the two-pillar inclusive framework approach and its far-reaching consequences for developing nations.

1

Historical Context & The Two-Pillar Mandate

The current international tax framework is built over rules conceptualised nearly a hundred years ago.1 The business models have evolved over time, and with the advent of internet and consequent digitalisation, avenues have opened up for large Multi-National Enterprises (MNEs) to devise innovative structures for minimising tax liabilities.

1. Historical Note: It has been nearly 100 years since The League of Nations (predecessor organization to the United Nations) worked on and published a draft model for international tax treaties, which formed the bedrock for both the OECD and US model tax conventions.

Today all functions—from starting a business to selling products/services and repatriating sales proceeds—are digitally managed without any need for physical presence. In 2015, the OECD issued its first set of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) reports, notably Action Plan 1: “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy”. On 12 October 2020, OECD released the two-pillar blueprint, and by July 2021, approximately 130 countries joined the consensus to ensure fair taxing rights.

Pillar One: Re-allocation of Taxing Rights

Applies to roughly the top 100 biggest and most profitable MNEs (revenue > €20bn, PBT > 10%). It re-allocates a share of their non-routine profits to market jurisdictions where goods/services are consumed, replacing traditional physical PE requirements with an economic nexus.

Pillar Two: Global Minimum Tax (15% GMT)

Creates a level playing field by establishing a Global Minimum Tax rate of 15% for MNE groups with annual revenues of at least €750 million. Operates via the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR), Untaxed Payments Rule (UTPR), and Subject to Tax Rule (STTR).

2

Pillar One Architecture: Amount A & Amount B Mechanics

Pillar One addresses the tax challenges arising from extremely large business groups capable of creating complex multinational structures to avoid or defer taxes under traditional source/residence rules. It introduces two foundational concepts:

Amount A: A formulaic share of residual/non-routine profits allocated to market jurisdictions where revenues are generated, irrespective of whether the MNE has a physical presence or Permanent Establishment (PE).
Amount B: A standardized safe-harbour remuneration model for related-party distributors performing “Baseline Marketing and Distribution Activities” (BMDA), benchmarked against arm’s length principles.

Fundamental Principles Underpinning Pillar One:

  • Group-Level Taxable Profits: Taxable profits are determined at a consolidated MNE group level rather than separate entity-by-entity accounting, eliminating internal transfer pricing distortions.
  • Source State Taxing Rights Without PE: Direct allocation of taxing rights to market states irrespective of physical PE.
  • End-Customer Nexus: Sourcing is tied to the location of the end-consumer rather than the payer entity.
  • Formulaic Apportionment: Amount A uses formulaic profit-splitting, while other income relies on traditional Transfer Pricing (TP).
  • Inbuilt Dispute Prevention: Mandatory binding dispute resolution mechanism (with limited opt-out flexibility for developing countries strictly on TP and PE matters).
3

Determination of Amount A: Five-Step Allocation Framework

The 5-Step Process to Determine Amount A:

  1. Determine the size of the business based on the revenue threshold.
  2. Apply nexus and revenue sourcing rules to identify eligible market countries.
  3. Determine the consolidated adjusted Profit Before Tax (PBT).
  4. Allocate Amount A profits to eligible market jurisdictions via formula.
  5. Eliminate double taxation across participating states.

Activity Test

Business must fall under Automated Digital Services (ADS) (online ads, social media, search engines, OTT content) or Customer Facing Business (CFB). Extractive industries and regulated financial services are excluded.

Dual Threshold Test

MNE must satisfy: (i) Gross revenues > €20 billion (to be reduced to €10bn after 7 years around 2030), AND (ii) Profitability > 10% (PBT/Revenue) in at least 2 of 4 prior periods and on average across the 4 periods.

Quantitative Nexus Thresholds:

  • Jurisdictions with GDP > €40 billion: Revenue from jurisdiction must exceed €1 million per annum.
  • Jurisdictions with GDP ≤ €40 billion: Revenue from jurisdiction must exceed €250,000 per annum.
Sourcing Rules: Revenue is sourced to the end-market jurisdiction where goods or services are ultimately consumed. Allocation keys apply during a 3-year transitional phase, alongside a back-stop rule to ensure no revenue remains unallocated.
Numerical Illustration: Amount A Profit Split Formula
Step 1: Determine PBT ratio. Normal / Routine Profit is pegged at 10% of revenue (retained exclusively by the residence jurisdiction).
Step 2: Residual / Non-Routine Profit is any profit margin exceeding 10%.
Step 3: 25% of the residual profit represents “Amount A” to be allocated among qualifying market jurisdictions based on relative local revenue.
Particulars USD Bn % Remarks
Revenue 40 - Revenue exceeds EUR 20bn (USD 22bn)
Profit before Tax (PBT) (A) 9 23% Profitability exceeds 10%
Split of Profits:
Routine Profits % (B) 4 10% Exclusively for residence jurisdiction
Non Routine Profits % (C) 5 13% Base for determining Amount A (25% of $5B = $1.25B allocable)
Loss Carry-Forward: Unabsorbed losses arising after implementation and during the 3 years preceding implementation can be carried forward for 10 years to offset future PBT.
4

Amount B Benchmarking & Mandatory Dispute Resolution

Amount B: Baseline Marketing & Distribution Activities (BMDA)

Amount B seeks to standardize and simplify transfer pricing rules for routine distribution entities. Key features:

  • Methodology: The Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) is designated as the most appropriate TP method, using net profit indicators like Return on Sales adjusted for geography and industry.
  • Preservation of Existing Rulings: Amount B does not override prior Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) or MAP settlements.
  • Unresolved Consensus: No consensus yet exists regarding sales agents or commissionaires whose functional profiles differ from baseline marketing and distribution.
  • Capacity Building: Substantially aids developing economies by reducing complex transfer pricing audits and litigation.

Mandatory Dispute Prevention and Resolution Mechanism:

Pillar One mandates an early certainty framework. The lead tax administration (ultimate parent jurisdiction) forms a Review Panel of 6 to 8 interested tax administrations. If consensus fails, a second Determination Panel is constituted, whose decision is binding on all participating states.

* Limited opt-out flexibility is available to certain developing countries solely for TP and PE disputes, but NOT for Amount A issues.
5

Critical Strategic Considerations & Reservations for India

1. Forfeiture of Equalisation Levy (₹ 4,000 Crores):

India currently collects approximately ₹ 4,000 crores annually from its unilateral 2% Equalisation Levy on e-commerce operators. Under the multilateral convention, all unilateral digital taxes must be withdrawn, while revenue accruals under Pillar One remain uncertain and subject to volatility.

2. The Amazon Paradox & 10% Profit Margin Filter:

The 10% global profit threshold is unreasonably high. For example, Amazon—with a market capitalization of $1.7 trillion—failed to meet the 10% profitability test for FY 2021 on a consolidated basis (retail low-margin drag), completely escaping Amount A despite reaping enormous profits from its Indian user base. In years where it exceeds 10% (e.g. 19.6% PBT), only 2.4% of total revenue is pooled across all global market states.

3. Dissent of Developing Countries:

Developing economies including Nigeria, Kenya, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka withdrew from the Inclusive Framework citing inequitable profit distribution that disproportionately favours residence states over consumption nations.

4. 7-Year Review Period Is Unreasonably Protracted:

Waiting 7 years (until 2030) to lower the revenue threshold from €20bn to €10bn is far too distant. Emerging economies like India must negotiate to reduce this review window to 3 years to prevent base erosion.

5. Consolidated Accounting Dilution Risk:

Because Amount A is based on global consolidated financial statements, losses suffered by an MNE in unsuccessful business ventures or unprofitable foreign markets dilute global PBT, reducing India’s tax share even when Indian operations are highly profitable.

Next Steps, Tentative Timelines & Conclusion

November 2022
Text of MLC & Explanatory Statement for Amount A
First Half 2023
Formal Signatures to Multilateral Convention (MLC)
2024
Expected Entry into Force following Domestic Ratifications

Conclusion: While the initiative of bringing certainty to tax challenges in the digital economy is a commendable move, the complexities involved and the determination and allocation of profits to member jurisdictions appear questionable. Given that unilateral measures like Equalisation Levy must be surrendered, it is only fair that India and fellow developing nations ensure robust safeguards so that there is no net loss to the national exchequer.